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CLASS ACTIONS AND THE UNIFORM CLASS ACTIONS
ACT: FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
A Uniform Class Actions Act' (UCAA) has been recently drafted and
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. 2 The final version, adopted by the Conference by a vote of
fifty to one, is the result of five tentative drafts and two years of work by
a drafting committee composed of judges, law professors, and practicing
lawyers. 3 Although the UCAA represents a compromise' and occupies
the middle ground in a highly controversial area, if adopted it would
facilitate the bringing of representative actions in state courts.
The class action was originally developed by courts of equity as an
efficient judicial device designed to adjudicate common claims involving
numerous parties.5 It is generally recognized6 that the first fully litigated
decision sustaining a class action, Brown v. Vermuden,7 arose in equity
300 years ago although the origin of the class action concept may be
much older than that. Some states still recognize a common law action9
but class actions today are primarily based upon statute or rule. Prior to
the drafting of the UCAA these statutes and rules could be divided into
three types. The first type of statute is based upon the 1849 amendments
to the New York Field Code which was the initial attempt to codify the
1. UNIFORM CLASS ACTIONS [ACT] [RULE] [hereinafter cited as UCAA]. A copy of the
UCAA is appended to this comment.
2. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 645 N. Michigan
Ave., Chicago, Il. 60611.
3. Vestal, States Need Machinery for Handling Class Actions, Uniform Law Memo 10
(Spring/Summer 1977). Professor Vestal was the chairman of the drafting committee for
the UCAA.
4. Id.
5. Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q.
399, 401 (1934).
6. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 246, at 467-68 (5th ed. 1941); J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS § 94 (1838).
7. 22 Eng. Rep. 796, 802 (Ch. 1676). Reverend Carrier, subsequently replaced as Vicar
of Worselworth by Reverend Brown, sued both miners and owners of the lead mines of
Derbyshire to establish a one-tenth interest in the mines because the miners were not
paying their tithes.
8. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 515, 516
(1974).
9. See, e.g., People v..City of Chicago, 73 Ill. App. 2d 184, 219 N.E.2d 548 (1966);
Evans v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 300 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 1974).
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pre-existing equity law on representative suits.'° A second type of state
statute follows the original version of the class actions rule, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23, adopted by the Supreme Court in 1938.11
The third type mirrors the present version of FRCP 23, a 1966 revision of
the original rule. 2
The accessibility of federal courts as a forum for class actions has been
limited 13 and two recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court,
Zahn v. International Paper Co. 14 and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 15
have further severely reduced this accessibility. In Zahn, the Court held
that each of the class members, not just the representative parties, in a
diversity action under FRCP 23 must satisfy the $10,000.00 juris-
dictional minimum amount or be excluded from the class.' 6 In Eisen, the
Court required that personal notice be given to all identifiable class
members in a FRCP 23(b) type action with costs to be borne by the
plaintiffs. " Because of the difficulties involved in bringing a state class
suit under statutes based upon the Field Code and the original FRCP 23,
in response to the Zahn and Eisen decisions, and in recognition of the
growing number of multistate class actions, the Conference undertook to
prepare the UCAA.' 8
A result of compromise, the UCAA has already been criticized from
both conservative 19 and liberal20 viewpoints. These critics appear to agree
however, that the Act allows for excessive judicial discretion. Such
criticism seems to be unfounded. 21 The UCAA may be considered as
both an "act" and a "rule." It was designed for use by state court judges
10. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-105
(1958).
11. See, e.g., Iow)k CODE R. Civ. P. 42 (1975); Mo. REy. STAT. § 507.070 (1969).
12. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. 23 (West 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. CH.
CT. R. 23 (Mitchie 1975).
13. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969). The Supreme Court ruled that in a
diversity suit brought as a class action, the claims of the individual class members could
not be aggregated to satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement.
14. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
15. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). There are eight reported Eisen opinions: 417 U.S. 156 (1974);
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966); 54
F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
16. 414 U.S. at 301.
17. 417 U.S. at 176-77.
18. UCAA, Prefatory Note.
19. Scher, Uniform Class Actions, A Critical View, 63 A.B.A.J. 840 (1977).
20. Moore, Uniform Class Actions, Does It Go Far Enough?, 63 A.B.A.J. 842 (1977).
21. The UCAA has also been subject to attack for being inflexible and too specific in its
provisions. Statement of thle Section of Public Utility Law, American Bar Association on
the Proposed Uniform Class Actions Act 6 (Nov. 9, 1976).
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who have not handled many class suits and who need the specificity of
the UCAA's provisions for guidance. 22 The twenty-two provisions of the
UCAA are certainly more detailed than FRCP 23. FRCP 23 was itself
recognized as a broad outline of general policies and directions2 3 and was
criticized for the amount of discretion left to the trial judge.24 It will be
shown that the specificity of the UCAA's provisions raises some obvious
but unanswered questions.
Thus, the UCAA has already provoked disagreement concerning one
of its fundamental aspects, that of specificity versus judicial discretion.
The UCAA has been adopted in modified form by Pennsylvania.25 As
additional states consider the UCAA, debate over its form, purpose, and
various provisions is likely to become more intense, since it contains
some innovative and highly controversial sections.26
II. FUNCTION
Before examining six of the UCAA's more interesting provisions for
some of the issues and questions which they raise, it is first necessary to
review the underlying policy questions which a state legislature contem-
plating enactment of the UCAA should address. Since the structure of an
effective act must be determined by the function it is intended to serve,
careful consideration of the following questions will determine the form
in which future class action statutes will be enacted.
A. What is the Primary Purpose of the Class Action?
In order to draft an effective class action act, a state legislature must
first determine what it views as the primary purpose of the class action.
This is the key question. One viewpoint is that the class action should
serve the traditional purpose of litigation, which is recovery to each
22. Vestal, States Need Machinery For Handling Class Actions, Uniform Law Memo 8
(Spring/Summer 1977).
23. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,43 F.R.D. 39,52
(1968). Judge Frankel viewed the discretionary aspects of FRCP 23 not as an invitation to
exercise power but as a challenge to use labor and imagination to form a huge body of
procedural common law. For a contrasting view by Justice Black, see note 24 infra.
24. 1 particularly think that every member of the Court should examine with great
care the amendments relating to class suits. It seems to me that they place too
much power in the hands of the trial judges and that the rules might almost as well
simply provide that "class suits can be maintained either for or against particular
groups whenever in the discretion of a judge he thinks it is wise."
Statement of Justice Black dissenting to Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 383
U.S. 1029, 1035 (1966).
25. 1977 Pa. Legis. Serv. R. Civ. P. 1701-1716, at 261.
26. See Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 A.B.A.J. 837 (1977).
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individual plaintiff or class member.27 It is under this class action concept
that the strict requirements of case or controversy, personal jurisdiction,
individual notice, individual measure and recovery of damages, and
existing rules regarding solicitation and attorney's fees are rigidly fol-
lowed. Under this view, the amount of prospective individual recoveries
may be so insignificant as not to justify the time and expense of litiga-
tion.28
The contrary approach is that individual recovery is inherently difficult
to achieve and thus the primary purpose of the class action should be the
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and the deterrence of socially undesir-
able conduct which results from the threat of litigation. Just as a wrong-
doer should not be allowed to retain damages from a one million dollar
injury to one person, he should not retain damages from a one dollar
injury to a million people. The focus is on the wrongdoer and not upon
the injured party as in the more traditional approach, although there may
still be individual recovery. 29 Requirements such as individual notice to
each class member are no longer as significant, and concepts such as
fluid recovery30 and attorneys' fee awards in successful injunction actions
become significant. 31 The importance of the distinctions between the
viewpoints is particularly apparent when dealing with factual situations
involving a large number of class members, each with an individually
small amount of potential recovery. In these situations claimants may be
unaware of their injury or unwilling to incur the cost and inconvenience
of pursuing their remedy.
B. Is Judicial Action the Preferable Procedure?
A legislature must also decide whether judicial action is the preferable
procedure. The increasing workload of the courts, recognition that the
judicial system may not be equipped to handle numerous parties with
small individual claims, and the fact that class actions often force judges
into the role of administrators in weighing social goals and distributing
class relief, have called the very existence of the judicial class action into
question. "The emergence of the class action inescapably forces con-
sideration of the characteristics of the judicial and the administrative
27. Although UCAA § 3(a)(2) provides for either a plaintiff or defendant class, this
comment will discuss the issues in the context of the more frequent plaintiff class
situation.
28. See, e.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 625-26 (3d Cir. 1972).
29. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1022 (2d Cir. 1973) (dissenting
opinion).
30. See notes 195-203 infra and accompanying text.
31. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
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process because its features in many instances are derived from both.' '32
This is particularly true where the deterrence and disgorgement functions
are emphasized. Many of the same considerations also apply under the
individual recovery theory, although the traditional procedural restric-
tions, while perhaps not allowing for maximum recovery, do tend to
lessen many of the court's difficulties in administering class relief. At
least one court has called for alternative procedures: "Another, better
method of attaining the desired objectives should be sought-perhaps
one to be administered by a public body in existence, federal or state
administrative agencies, or by specifically constituted tribunals. ",33
Class actions often involve substantial legal issues on the question of
liability. Parties must not be deprived of meaningful access to the judicial
system. Also, the cost of establishing and administering an alternative
mechanism and the problems of integrating it into our existing system
must be weighed against the difficulties inherent in utilizing the present
court procedures.
C. Is Uniformity Necessary or Desirable?
A final question which a legislature should consider is whether uni-
formity is necessary or desirable. The necessity for uniform state class
action procedures has been questioned often. It has been argued that there
is not a need, as in the case of the Uniform Commercial Code for
instance, for broad national planning. When existing state procedural
rules are incorporated into the UCAA, it will necessarily lead to diversity
in its application. Furthermore, there is no more need to disturb the
diversity and individuality of the states in the class action context than in
other procedural areas such as appellate review, evidentiary rules, or the
size of juries.34
On the other hand, many activities have an impact on large numbers of
persons, often from several states. Supporters of the UCAA feel it will
assist states in handling multistate class actions and will reduce the
chance of multiplicity of litigation and inconsistent judgments. 31
Ill. STRUCTURE
There are six key provisions of the UCAA which best indicate the
intent of the drafting committee. The intent apparently is to facilitate the
32. La Mar v. H. & B. Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
34. Statement of the Section of Public Utility Law, American Bar Association on the
Proposed Uniform Class Actions Act 3-5 (Nov. 9, 1976).
35. UCAA, Prefatory Note.
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bringing of representative actions in the state court systems by relaxing
strict traditional procedural requirements, while simultaneously taking
measures to insure that the interests of both the absent class members and
the rights of the class opponent are adequately protected. These six
provisions concern notice, personal jurisdiction, class certification ap-
pealability, discovery, solicitation and maintenance, and relief. These
provisions will be compared with existing law and some of the issues
which they raise and problems which may result from enactment of the
UCAA will also be examined.
A. Notice
Before the significance of the unusual notice section in the UCAA36
can be fully understood, a comparison of the FRCP 23 requirements for
maintaining a class action and the UCAA requirements is necessary.
Prior to its amendment in 1966, FRCP 23 described three types of
class actions known as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious." 37 A "true"
class action involved a joint or common right, the adjudication of which
determined the rights of all parties who would be bound by the judgment
regardless of whether they joined in the action.38
A "hybrid" action, similar to an in rem or quasi in rem action,
determined all the rights of absent parties, but only to specific property.
The judgment on any other issues was only binding on the participating
parties.39
The "spurious" action has been referred to as a type of permissive
joinder in which the parties were required to "opt-in" to the action.
Participation was allowed only if common questions of law or fact were
involved.4° The "spurious" action was criticized as lessening the social
utility of the class action device since multiplicity of litigation was not
avoided unless the individual class members took affirmative steps to
intervene in the action.
41
In 1966 FRCP 23 was amended to abolish these categories in order to
obtain a more workable approach. To maintain a class action under the
amended rule the requirements of subsection 23(a)42 and either subsec-
36. UCAA § 7.
37. See generally Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by
the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 570-75 (1937).
38. Id. at 572-73.
39. Id. at 574.
40. Id. at 574-76.
41. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 684, 703-05 (1941).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
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tion 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3)4 3 must be met. FRCP 23(b)(3) is
'similar to the old "spurious" type action in requiring that common
questions of law or fact be involved. Unlike the 1938 rule, FRCP 23 as
amended will include absent parties in a judgment unless they specifical-
ly decide to "opt-out."I In order to inform the class members of their
ability to "opt-out," FRCP 23(c)(2) requires "the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort." 45 This notice requirement is
necessary only in FRCP 23(b)(3) type actions.
Contrast FRCP 23 with the UCAA, which does not categorize class
actions. Section 1 of the UCAA allows a representative action to be
brought if the class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable 46 and
there exists a common question of law or fact.4 7 In addition, the class
action should promote the fair and efficient adjudication of the controver-
sy48 and the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
43. Id. 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole, or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any question affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controver-
sy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
44. Id. 23(c)(3).
45. Id. 23(c)(2).
46. UCAA § I(I).
47. Id. § 1(2).
48. Id. § 2(b)(2).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
interests of the class.49 Section 3 lists thirteen criteria50 to be considered
in determining whether the class action should be permitted for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. UCAA subsections 3(a)(2)
and (3) correspond to FRCP 23(b)(1), UCAA subsection 3(a)(4) corre-
sponds to FRCP 23(b)(2), and UCAA subsections 3(a)(5), (8), (9), (10)
and (11) correspond to FRCP 23(b)(3) type actions.
Section 7 of the UCAA provides for notice to absent class members 51
regardless of the nature of the action or the type of relief sought. A highly
controversial subsection is 7(d) which requires personal or mailed notice
only to persons whose potential recovery or liability is estimated to
exceed $100 if their "identit[ies] and whereabouts can be ascertained by
the exercise of reasonable diligence.' '52 For those with less than $100 at
stake, only notice "reasonably calculated to apprise the members of the
class of the pendency of the action" is required.5 3 This provision would
promote the deterrence and disgorgement functions of a class action. In
addition to the question of how and when this $100 limit is to be
determined, the major issue is whether or not the notice requirement in
the UCAA, which specifies personal notice only to those class members
whose liability is estimated to exceed $100, if enacted, would violate
constitutional due process.
The extent of the due process limitations on notice is indicated by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of FRCP 23. While there is no notice
requirement for FRCP 23(b)(1).,or (2) type actions, FRCP 23(c)(2) does
provide a notice requiremenr for actions brought under 23(b)(3). The
leading case interpreting..fhe FRCP 23(c)(2) notice requirement is Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.51 In Eisen, the Supreme Court interpreted the
"unmistakable" language of FRCP 23(c)(2) to require that individual
notice be sent to each class member whose location could be ascertained
through reasonable effort.5 5 The Eisen Court, though recognizing the
49. Id. § 2(b)(3).
50. Id. § 3(a)(1)-(13).
51. Id. § 7.
52. Id. § 7(d).
53. Id. § 7(e).
54. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Morton Eisen filed a class action suit in United States District
Court alleging in his complaint that two odd-lot brokerage houses on the New York Stock
Exchange were monopolizing odd-lot trading and charging excessive fees in violation of
the Sherman Act. Eisen's individual trebled claim totaled seventy dollars, and the total
claim for the class of some six million shareholders was estimated to be between twenty-
two and sixty million dollars. Id. at 160; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253,265,
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
55. The Court stated: "[The express language and intent of rule 23(c)(2) leaves no
doubt that individual notice must be provided to those class members who are identifiable
through reasonable effort." 417 U.S. at 175.
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constitutional due process issue, rested its decision on the language of
FRCP 23(c)(2),56 which seems to clearly support the Supreme Court's
ruling. FRCP 23(c)(2) was drafted with this requirement because, as the
committee notes indicate, the committee felt such individual notice was
required to comport with due process.57
The main case relied upon by the FRCP advisory committee, though
not specifically involving a class action under FRCP 23, was Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 8 In considering the due process
requirements necessary to ensure a judgment's res judicata effect on
absent parties, the Mullane Court stated: "An elementary and funda-
mental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 5 9 The Mullane
Court did state that it is not unreasonable for the state to dispense with
more certain notice to absentees whose interests are either conjectural or
future6° and that a res judicata effect may foreclose the rights of persons
"missing or unknown" even though an indirect means of notification is
used. The Court appeared to authorize a balancing approach. 61 However,
as the Court later stated in Schroeder v. City of New York:62 "[N]otice
by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and
address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protect-
ed interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question.' '63
The purpose of giving notice to absent class members is to give them
an opportunity to take an active role in the litigation in order to protect
56. A California case has interpreted the Eisen decision as constitutionally not requir-
ing individual notice. "[I]f the United States Supreme Court had desired to hold that such
notice was constitutionally required, it certainly could have phrased its holding in less
Delphic language." Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 968, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376,
381 (1975) (footnote omitted). See also Gant v. City of Lincoln, 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d
549 (1975).
57. The Advisory Committee's Note on the Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure,
39 F.R.D. 98 passim (1966).
58. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
59. Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 317.
61. The Court in Mullane stated:
The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between
[the] interests [of the state and the individual interests protected by the fourteenth
amendment] in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may
be utilized or what test it must meet. Personal service has not in all circumstances
been regarded as indispensible . . ..
Id. at 314.
62. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
63. Id. at 212-13.
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their interests. Are the requirements of due process satisfied if the absent
parties' interests are adequately represented, whether or not they have
personal notice of the action? In Hansberry v. Lee, 64 the Supreme Court
dealt with adequacy of representation. The Court referred to the judg-
ment in a class or representative suit as a "recognized exception" 65 to the
general rule that a judgment in personam is not binding on a person who
is not a party to the litigation. The Court noted that due process is
satisfied where there is adequate representation of an absentee's rights
and interests by parties who are present. 66 Lower courts have also
suggested that adequacy of representation without notice is enough. 67
The Supreme Court has not yet squarely faced the issue of whether
adequate representation without personal notice is sufficient to satisfy
due process in a class action context. Neither Schroeder nor Mullane
involved a FRCP 23 class action, which requires that the interests of the
class be protected. Mullane suggests a practical approach to due proc-
ess. 68 Persons with claims of less than $100 are unlikely to bring indi-
vidual suits. It would seem more reasonable and beneficial to these
persons to allow a representative action on their behalf even if they would
not receive notice. Thus, by only requiring notice reasonably calculated
to apprise those class members with claims of less than $100 of the
pendency of the action, the UCAA adopts a practical approach which
may satisfy constitutional due process standards.
There is one additional question: when both practical and due process
considerations are taken into account, is a res judicata effect a necessity
in a class action context? 69 The class opponent would seem to be the one
most concerned with achieving finality in the litigation. However, per-
sons not initially bound who have claims of less than $100 are unlikely to
64. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
65. In Hansberry the Supreme Court stated:
To these general rules there is a recognized exception that, to an extent not precisely
defined by judicial opinion, the judgment in a "class" or "representative" suit to
which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those
represented who are not made parties to it.
Id. at 41.
66. Id. at 42-43.
67. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,256 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 980 n.10 (D.D.C. 1972),
aff'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
68. 339 U.S. at 306, 314.
69. For the view that the defendant has no constitutional right to be subjected to only
one law suit, see Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 968, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381
(1975). For the view that the defendant is entitled to a judgment that will be meaningful,
see Home Say. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1011-14, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485, 488-
89 (1974).
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initiate much additional litigation. Collateral estoppel and stare decisis
may work against them, as well as the statute of limitations. 71 Successful
individual claimants could be paid from those funds which either revert
to the defendant or escheat to the state.71 Class members who are not
notified initially of the class certification may of course still be notified
that they may directly participate in any recovery. Thus, as a practical
matter, a res judicata effect as to those claimants with small potential
recoveries is not necessary.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
One of the purposes of preparing the UCAA was to assist states in
handling multistate class actions. 72 This can be achieved only if state
courts have an effective means of binding nonresidents. The extent to
which a state may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction raises constitution-
al due process issues similar to those discussed in the previous section on
notice. Unfortunately, the approach to the jurisdictional issue by the
UCAA drafting committee will only lead to confusion and is an abroga-
tion of their responsibility to face the issue directly.
Section 6 of the UCAA provides that a state court "may exercise
jurisdiction over any person who is a member of the class suing or being
sued if: [(1)] a basis for jurisdiction exists or would exist in a suit against
the person under the law of this State . . . . ,,73 This fundamental
provision destroys the uniform national treatment of class actions which
the UCAA is trying to achieve since states' jurisdictional requirements
vary. This section also raises many unanswered questions. The drafting
committee's comment to section 6 states that persons beyond the court's
reach may be able to participate in a plaintiff class by intervention. Will
notice be required to be sent to these persons to inform them of their
opportunity to intervene? Is this a type of "opt-in" provision, the general
concept of which was rejected by the drafting committee?74 Without
70. The statute of limitations is tolled for all class members pending a determination of
class status. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). However, there
seems to be no reason to toll the statute for those persons choosing not to participate in the
class recovery.
71. See notes 199-203 infra and accompanying text.
72. UCAA, Prefatory Note.
73. UCAA § 6(a)(1). Section 6 also provides an extraterritorial state jurisdiction provi-
sion which would allow the exercise of jurisdiction in a sister state if that state has a
reciprocal grant of power. Although subject to constitutional due process questions, there
is some precedent for this type of provision. See, e.g., UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS OF LAW [AcT] [RULE]; UNIFORM FOREIGN DEPOSITIONS ACT; UNIFORM MAN-
DATORY DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS ACT.
74. Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 A.B.A.J. 837, 838 (1977).
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notice, the opportunity to intervene may be meaningless. If these persons
do not intervene they may subject the class opponent to numerous
individual suits. In such "minimum contact" states as California,75 when
and how will jurisdiction over each potential class member be deter-
mined? If an aggregate judgment is obtained in favor of the class will the
amount of the judgment later be reduced proportionately to exclude
parties over whom the court has no jurisdiction under state law?
All parties have an interest in securing a judgment which is certain in
effect and binding upon every potential class member. The plaintiff
wants a judgment as large as possible, the class opponent has a desire not
to be subjected to numerous lawsuits and potentially conflicting judg-
ments, and the courts have an interest in reducing litigation and promot-
ing judicial efficiency. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. ,76 the Court clearly stated that the issue of notice is quite different
from the issue of the extent of a state's power." The Court held that a
New York court could settle all questions respecting the management of a
common trust and the decision would be binding on nonresidents. What
is the maximum jurisdictional effect which a judgment in a representative
action can have consistent with due process? An examination of existing
case law provides a clue to the answer.
Due process in the class action context may mean only that the
interests of a person must be adequately represented if it is not possible
for him or his personally selected representative to appear. 8 In the case
of Smith v. Swormstedt,79 the Supreme Court early recognized the prac-
tical problems involved in a lawsuit where the parties are numerous. The
Court noted that rights and liabilities are subject to change by death or
otherwise and that it is very inconvenient, often to the point of preventing
prosecution, to make all interested persons parties. The Court then held
that a portion of the parties in interest may represent the entire group and
that the decree would bind all of them as if they were before the court.80
In Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs8l the Court, after quoting Smith,
held that a Minnesota court was required to give full faith and credit to a
class action judgment obtained in Connecticut.
The Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee82 indicated that where the
75. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West Supp. 1977).
76. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
77. Id. at 313.
78. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86, Comment b (1942).
79. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
80. Id. at 303.
81. 237 U.S. 662, 673 (1915).
82. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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interests of the class representative are the same as those of persons who
are not present and the procedures adopted fairly ensure the protection of
the absent parties, the fourteenth amendment is satisfied and the judg-
ment will bind those persons not within the jurisdiction of the court.83
This suggests that the unique nature of a class action may constitutionally
justify treatment different from that in the ordinary civil suit.
The recent Supreme Court case, Shaffer v. Heitner,84 which requires
that state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe, 8 may provide a basis for exerting
nationwide jurisdiction in a class action context. International Shoe Co.
v. Washington86 established the "minimum contacts" test87 for deter-
mining whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction. Shaffer indi-
cates that where the property providing the contact is also the subject
matter of the litigation, that may be sufficient to allow the exercise of
jurisdiction for that action, but not for any other purpose.88 If the
nonresidents are adequately protected, an interest in the outcome of the
litigation may itself be a sufficient minimum contact to satisfy the
requirements of due process.
Many lower federal courts have held that personal jurisdictional
concerns are satisfied if the representative parties are properly served and
within the jurisdiction of the court.89 State courts have reached a similar
conclusion. 90 In order to ensure the effectiveness of a class action, states
83. Courts are not infrequently called upon to proceed with causes in which the
number of those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or impossi-
ble the joinder of all because some are not within the jurisdiction. . . . In such cases
where the interests of those not joined are of the same class as the interests of those
who are, where it is considered that the latter fairly represent the former in the
prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all have a common interest, the
court will proceed to a decree.
Id. at 41-42.
84. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
85. Id. at 2584-85.
86. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
87. [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316.
88. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
89. See, e.g., Canuel v. Oskoian, 269 F.2d 311 (Ist Cir. 1959); Griffin v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co., 88 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. 11. 1949); Salvant v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 83 F. Supp.
391 (W.D. Ky. 1949).
90. North Carolina has held that one of its residents was bound by a judgment in a
California class action. Taylor v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 770, 200 S.E. 882
(1939). For similar holdings arising from the same California proceeding, see Larson v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 II1. 614, 27 N.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 698 (1940);
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considering enactment of a version of the UCAA should include a more
specific jurisdictional provision in accordance with the adequate repre-
sentation standard of Hansberry or the minimum contacts standard of
Shaffer. Under appropriate circumstances, this could provide for nation-
wide jurisdiction.
C. Class Certification Appealability
A class action proceeds in two essential steps: (1) the certification
stage, when there is a determination of the existence of a class; and (2) an
adjudication of the substantive merits of the plaintiff's case. A serious
problem can arise for both parties, though especially for a plaintiff class
with small individual claims, where a trial court refuses to permit a
plaintiff to maintain his lawsuit in the form of a class action (the
determination of which should be made as soon as practicable after the
commencement of the action)91 but does allow him to proceed on his
personal claim.9 2 There is no special provision in FRCP 23 allowing or
disallowing an interlocutory appeal either from a favorable or from an
adverse class determination. Although not exactly clear as to timing, the
obvious intent of UCAA section 4(c) is to provide for interlocutory
appeal. Section 4(c) states that "[a]n order certifying or refusing to
certify an action as a class action is appealable."
93
There are competing considerations involved in deciding if interlocu-
tory appeal of the class determination should be allowed. The court's
desire to promote judicial efficiency by avoiding piecemeal litigation is
an argument against interlocutory appeal. Contrast this with the parties'
need for certainty as to potential risks and rewards, which favors an early
class determination. However, in a class action context, this would also
promote judicial efficiency. The courts seem to be divided; the majority
of the state courts favor immediate appeal, 94 while the federal courts
predominately take the contrary view.
95
There is one alternative which has always been open to the plaintiffs.
Levy v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 1941).
Although not addressing the issue of the binding effect of the judgment directly, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that "a class action may be utilized whether or
not all members of the class can be found within the State .... "Horst v. Guy, 211
N.W.2d 723, 729 (N.D. 1973).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1); UCAA § 2(a).
92. Though the class action is denied, the representative plaintiff may still proceed as
an individual. See, e.g., UCAA § 4(d).
93. Id. § 4(c).
94. Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 595 (1973).
95. Annot., 17 A.L.R. FED. 933 (1973).
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In Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young Co. ,96 the district court dismissed plain-
tiffs' class action complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs refused to
amend and judgment was entered dismissing the complaint with preju-
dice. Plaintiffs then appealed the judgment and the class action determi-
nation. This is a rather risky procedure because the plaintiffs' individual
claims would also have been finalized if the appellate court had upheld
the district court on the class action issue. However, for a plaintiff with a
small individual claim which would not be pursued without class status,
the risk is irrelevant.
Finality seems to be the keyword for determining appealability. How-
ever, the definition of what is final and what constitutes sufficient finality
varies from court to court. In some state courts, dismissal of the action as
to all but the representative plaintiffs has been held to be a final disposi-
tion with respect to absent class members, and therefore appealable, 97 or
has simply been held appealable as a final order. 98 Other state courts have
held that such an order is not final and hence not appealable.
99
This final decision concept is also important in federal court deci-
sions.100 However, there have been so many exceptions and qualifica-
tions created that the state of federal law is uncertain. The first type of
exception is that which is statutorily created. Where injunctive relief is
requested, 10 1 courts have allowed appeal where the denial of class status
has narrowed the scope of injunctive relief. 0 2 Another statutory excep-
tion is the Interlocutory Appeals Act. 103 The Third Circuit has permitted a
section 1292(b) appeal of a class action certification. 10 Even the "drastic
96. 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
97. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967); Slakey Bros. Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 265 Cal. App. 2d 204, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1968).
98. See, e.g., Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County Inst. Dist., 461 Pa. 641, 337 A.2d
586, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 919 (1975).
99. See, e.g., Taylor v. Major Fin. Co., 289 Ala. 458, 268 So. 2d 738 (1972).
100. "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts ...... 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
101. Id. § 1292(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States. . .granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing
to dissolve or modify injunctions . ..."
102. See, e.g., Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) provides that a district court is empowered to certify for
appeal an order "not otherwise appealable" if in its opinion the order involves a
"controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and. . .[where] an immediate appeal. . . may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation ....
104. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974).
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and extraordinary" 10 5 remedy of mandamus 1° has been used; 107 and
FRCP 54(b) has also been urged as a method of appeal.108
Among the various judicially developed exceptions to the finality rule
is the "collateral order" doctrine created in Cohen v. Beneficial Industri-
al Loan Corp. 'o The appealability of class action determinations would
seem to fit squarely into the "collateral order" doctrine. The questions of
common issues of law and fact and adequacy of representation are
certainly important and are usually independent from any question of
liability. Appeal has been allowed under this doctrine," 0 although the
same circuit has also denied the right to make such appeals.",
Another exception is the "death knell" doctrine, announced by the
Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, allowing appeal
where the denial of class action certification would effectively end the
action, particularly for numerous plaintiffs with small amounts of indi-
vidual recovery. Other circuits have rejected the doctrine."13
Many of these cases seem to be applying or avoiding the finality rule
without considering its purpose, which is to avoid piecemeal review and
promote judicial efficiency." 4 If certification is denied, numerous indi-
vidual suits could develop; if certification is granted, the increased
potential liability of the defendant could be an unfair inducement for him
to settle the claim. Uncertainty as to class status will necessarily affect
the manner in which both sides treat the case. Thus, fairness and judicial
efficiency are promoted not by postponement of appeal on class certifica-
tion, but by appeal as early as possible in the litigation. The drafters of
the UCAA have provided for what seems to be the preferable approach,
that of interlocutory appeal. There has been some discussion as to
whether the plaintiff and defendant should have the same right of ap-
105. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
107. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. District Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
108. Comment, Appealability of Class Action Determinations, 44 FORDHAM L. REV.
548 (1975).
109. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Court stated that there are decisions "which finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546.
110. See, e.g., Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (2d Cir.
1974).
111. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); Kohn
v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
112. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
113. See, e.g., King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621-26 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 925 (1972).
114. See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945).
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peal. "15 The UCAA makes no express distinction and there is no reason to
imply one." 6 Judgment of dismissal as to the plaintiff, or certification
and the resulting exposure of the defendant to increased liability are
equally important considerations justifying an early class determination.
There is one serious problem with the UCAA in this area. The UCAA
provides that an order certifying or refusing to certify an action as a class
action 1 7 and an order amending the certification order are appealable. I"
It is possible for a plaintiff to request certification of a class many times
larger than his cause of action justifies and then make gradual reductions
in the proposed class size and appeal each subsequent adverse determina-
tion. Or perhaps, during trial, the defendant might continually request
that the class size be reduced and then appeal each adverse decision
which would repeatedly delay the trial. This has been an important factor
in the rejection of these appeals by the courts. 119 Permitting an appeal
each time a lower court issues a new certification order is clearly contrary
to the purpose of the finality rule. 120 One solution to this problem would
be to require that discovery related to class certification be completed
prior to any determination of class maintainability. Once the appellate
court has ruled on class certification, preferably before but possibly
during the trial on the merits, the determination should be considered
final at least until entry of judgment.
D. Discovery from Absentees
A major area of controversy under existing law is the determination of
the status of the absent class members. In particular, to what extent may
their participation be required, especially in the area of discovery. FRCP
23 includes no express provision requiring affirmative action by absent
115. Note, Class Action Certification Orders: An Argumentfor the Defendant's Right to
Appeal, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 621 (1974).
116. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (defendant); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (plaintiff).
117. UCAA § 4(c).
118. Id. § 5(c).
119. See, e.g., In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 518 F.2d 213,
215-16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. City of New
York, 501 F.2d 639, 644-48 (2d Cir. 1974); Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226, 227 (6th
Cir. 1969).
120. The possibility of amendments to the class certification order has been used by at
least one court for support of the proposition that the drafters of FRCP 23 did not intend
immediate appealability. See Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141,
143-44 (2d Cir. 1970). The UCAA allows both amendments and interlocutory appeal.
UCAA §§ 4(c), 5(a), (d).
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class members. The drafters of the UCAA have included an express
provision concerning discovery against absent class members. 121
Some existing federal cases have held that no discovery at all may be
obtained from absent class members. The rationale has been based upon
two similar theories. The first is that for FRCP 23 actions, absent class
members are not considered parties and thus are not subject to FRCP 33
or 37. 122 This is an oversimplification since absent class members are
considered parties for other purposes; e.g., they have standing to appeal
a settlement and are bound by any res judicata effect. 123 The other basis
for denying discovery from absent class members is that FRCP 23
contemplates an adversary proceeding involving only the class represen-
tatives, while the other members of the class are permitted to await
passively the outcome of the suit. 24
Courts which have required discovery have based it upon the authority
of FRCP 3711 or 23(c) and (d). 126 Reliance upon FRCP 23 seems to be
unfounded in light of the express wording of the statute. If, in fact, "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class," 12 7 discovery from absentees should not be
necessary. However, the courts have recognized that discovery may
under many circumstances be desirable or even necessary. 128 The drafters
of the UCAA, realizing that a strict rule against nonrepresentative
discovery was inappropriate, provided in section 10 for discovery (but
only on court order) from a class member who has not appeared.1
29
There are at least three corollary questions which must be addressed.
The drafters unfortunately provided guidance on only one. Once it is
decided that absent party discovery will be allowed, it must be deter-
121. UCAA § 10(a) provides in part: "Discovery under [applicable discovery rules]
may be used only on order of the court against a member of the class who is not a
representative party or who has not appeared."
122. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
123. See, e.g., Certic v. Cuyahoga Lake Carpenters Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579, 581
(6th Cir. 1972).
124. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
125. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972).
126. See, e.g., Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391,403-04 (S.D.
Iowa 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968).
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
128. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
129. UCAA § 10(a).
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mined: (1) under what circumstances the discovery will be allowed; (2)
at what time and for what purpose information may be sought from the
absent class members; and (3) what sanctions, if any, will be applied for
failure to comply with the discovery request.
In considering the first question, a fine line must be drawn between the
potential need of the defendants (assuming a plaintiff class) to know both
the nature and especially the extent of their potential liability and the
need to protect the class members from harassing and burdensome
questionnaires. Discovery may be necessary for a fair adjudication of the
controversy but could intimidate absentees who may not respond if their
individual claims are small. This has been recognized by the courts. In
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. ,130 the court stated
that before allowing discovery "a trial court must be assured that the
requested information is actually needed in preparation for trial and that
discovery devices are not used to take unfair advantage of 'absent' class
members.''131 The concept of court control over discovery, contrary to
the usual theory of discovery,132 was adopted by the drafters of the
UCAA. 33 Additionally, the committee listed some factors to be con-
sidered by the trial court in deciding whether discovery should be al-
lowed: the timing of the request; the subject matter covered; whether
representatives of the class are seeking discovery on the subject to be
covered; and whether discovery will result in annoyance, oppression, or
undue burden or expense. 134
The second question revolves around the two basic purposes for which
discovery may be had in a class action. The first is to gather information
necessary at an early stage of the action to ensure that the preliminary
determination of the existence of a class has an adequate foundation.
135
The second purpose is to obtain information which is necessary to
establish the defendant's defenses on the substantive issues of liability. 
136
130. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972).
131. Id. at 1006.
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
133. UCAA § 10(a).
134. Id.
135. For cases allowing discovery on this issue, see, e.g., Unicorn Field, Inc. v.
Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Goldstein v. Regal Crest,
Inc., 59 F.R.D. 396, 399 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
267, 271-72 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971)
(per curiam).
136. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44
F.R.D. 559, 577-78 (D. Minn. 1968).
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In addition to some earlier cases which have disallowed all discovery,
137
in 1974 the Supreme Court added another wrinkle which limits dis-
covery. In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. UtahI38 the Court
stated: "Not until the existence and limits of the class have been estab-
lished and notice of membership has been sent does a class member have
any duty to take note of the suit or to exercise any responsibility with
respect to it in order to profit from the eventual outcome of the case." 
139
Thus, under the FRCP discovery cannot be required until the initial class
certification has taken place. The concern is to avoid stirring up unneces-
sary litigation. 140 Although the UCAA speaks in terms of discovery
"against a member of the class,"' 4' it is not clear whether the committee
meant to limit discovery to the period subsequent to certification, as did
the Supreme Court in American Pipe, or to allow much broader dis-
covery with the consent of the court. Pre-certification discovery reg-
ulated by the court would provide a mechanism for reasonably evalua-
ting whether the action should proceed as a class action. This is consis-
tent with the tone of the UCAA.
The third issue relates to the sanctions to be applied for noncompliance
with discovery requests by absent class members. A parenthetical phrase
in the UCAA states that discovery should take place under "applicable
discovery rules." 142 This provision will necessarily cause diversity
among the states, contrary to the UCAA's purpose of establishing uni-
formity. Also, a class action is distinctly different from the usual civil
action. It would clearly be unreasonable, for instance, to expect each
class member to hire an attorney to answer any inquiries. While the
drafters of the UCAA are to be commended for establishing a provision
allowing for class discovery, their failure to provide guidance for the
consequences of noncompliance was a serious omission.
The consequences of noncompliance chosen by a particular court
depend to some extent upon the view which the court takes as to the
primary purpose of a class action. One alternative would allow discovery
from absent class members without a penalty for nonresponse, although
they may be required to file a claim to participate in any recovery. This
approach has been taken by a few courts. 143 If the primary purpose of the
137. See notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text.
138. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
139. Id. at 552.
140. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. District Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1078-79
(9th Cir. 1975), noted in 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 421 (1975).
141. UCAA § 10(a).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 71-72 (D.D.C. 1972); Korn v.
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class action is viewed as preventing unjust enrichment to the defendant
rather than seeking recovery for the absent class plaintiffs, then this
seems the preferable approach, especially if there is a large number of
class members with individually small amounts of recovery.
Even though not subject to sanctions, passive absentees would not
necessarily be immune from discovery. They could still be examined
through the use of non-party depositions and subpoenas to which any
person with relevant information may be subjected. 1" The discovery
practice of using a sampling technique has been approved by some
courts, 145 and can be used effectively, especially if the court sufficiently
narrows the common issues and divides the class into appropriate sub-
classes. 146
A second alternative would permit discovery backed by the sanction of
excluding nonresponding class members from the action, but without
prejudice to their individual claims. Under this approach the balance is
shifted toward individual recovery rather than punishment of the defend-
ant. The use of discovery here must be subjected to the type of close
scrutiny which the drafters of the UCAA have provided in order to
prevent the device from being used by the defendant simply as a mecha-
nism for reducing class size. This is similar to a proof of claim form used
by some courts' 47 to obtain information relevant to the class certification
question. However, the use of a claim device before liability of a group
of drug manufacturers to a class of retail drug purchasers was established
has been rejected. 148 The problem with applying the sanction of exclusion
is that it is very similar to a requirement that the class members take
affirmative action, essentially requiring them to "opt-in" to the class, a
requirement which was specifically rejected in both the 1966 revision of
the FRCP 149 and the UCAA.150 Applying the sanction of exclusion would
Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (for subsequent history see 456
F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972)); Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
144. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 832,500 P.2d 621,
103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972).
145. See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Pfizer,
Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972).
146. UCAA § 2(c).
147. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn.
1968).
148. See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub
nom. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
149. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 23.02-1, 23.10 (2d ed. 1977).
150. See Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 A.B.A.J. 837 (1977).
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mean that absent class members must take action either to be excluded
from the class or included in the judgment. Inaction would mean the class
member would be bound by res judicata and also barred from any
recovery.
A third and perhaps unnecessarily harsh sanction would be exclusion
of the class member from the class combined with a dismissal with
prejudice of his individual claim. This procedure has also been used on
occasion. 151
A careful limitation of the common questions and division of the class
into appropriate subclasses would greatly lessen the need for class dis-
covery. Discovery may be necessary under some circumstances but its
scope should be carefully supervised by the court. Sanctions against
individual class members should be avoided.
E. Solicitation and Maintenance
Section 17(b) of the UCAA contains a unique provision which is
bound to stir considerable controversy among members of the bar. The
relevant portion of the UCAA provides that "the court by order may
authorize and control the solicitation and expenditure of voluntary contri-
butions for [meeting the costs and litigation expenses of the action] from
members of the class, advances by the attorneys or others, or both,
subject to reimbursement from any recovery obtained for the class."
1 52
Thus, the drafters have provided for both solicitation and maintenance.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
153
allows a certain amount of attorney advertising. Solicitation, which
involves personal contact of clients, remains a violation of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility.54 Prohibiting solicitation may be a
valid form of restraint on the time, place, or manner of advertising.
There are two basic types of solicitation in regard to class actions. The
first of these is solicitation of parties by an attorney in order to file suit.
This includes solicitation of the first named plaintiff, of additional named
plaintiffs for a class action which has already been filed, and solicitation
of unnamed existing class members to provide them with direct represen-
tation. This last type of solicitation is not allowed under the UCAA.
Although there are persuasive arguments for allowing solicitation of
151. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
152. UCAA § 17(b).
153. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
154. "Obviously, a lawyer should not contact a non-client, directly or indirectly, for the
purpose of being retained to represent him for compensation." ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-3 (1975).
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clients in a class action context,155 courts have allowed discovery from
named plaintiffs concerning whether or not class attorneys solicited their
participation, 156 and solicitation of class representatives has been used as
justification for refusal to certify a class.
157
The second type of solicitation in class actions is that provided for in
the UCAA. Class action litigation contemplates an adversary proceeding
where only the representative plaintiffs take an active role. However,
costs of conducting such an action can be extremely high, especially if
notice is required to be sent to each class member. 158 The drafters of the
UCAA have provided for solicitation of voluntary contributions if
authorized by court order. 159
Traditionally in class actions the attorney-client relationship is an-
alyzed in terms of the named plaintiff and the attorney." District courts
have instituted gag orders restricting communications with absent class
members. 161 This is the reverse of the general rule that the client should
be informed of all relevant information. 6 2 The practice of restricting
communications is in accordance with the Manual for Complex and
Multidistrict Litigation,163 which specifically forbids solicitation of fees
and expenses. 164 The apparent fear is that the attorney will mislead the
members of the class. 16
5
There seems to be no valid reason to prohibit solicitation of voluntary
contributions from class members with the careful supervision of the
155. See Schoor, Class Actions: The Right to Solicit, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215
(1975).
156. See, e.g., Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D. Pa.
1973); Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Simon v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1021 (N.D. Tex.
1972).
157. See, e.g., Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
158. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 167 (1974), the cost of postage alone
was estimated to be $225,000.
159. UCAA § 17(b).
160. See, e.g., Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
161. See, e.g., American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Pickrel, 18 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 292 (D. Md.
1974); Vance v. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1513 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
162. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-8 (1975).
163. 49 F.R.D. 217 (1970).
164. Id. at 219.
More recently the ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1326 (1975)
has stated that it is ethically proper for an attorney to solicit funds to be used for expenses
in connection with preparation for litigation of a class suit, or the expense of mailing
notice, but that it is not proper for an attorney to solicit funds from class members for his
own compensation.
165. See, e.g., Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622, 625-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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court as provided for in the UCAA. If an injury has been done to a large
group, there is little reason to prevent recovery simply because one party
does not have the resources to conduct the litigation. 166 If this were the
rule the defendant would benefit by causing injury to the greatest number
of people possible, since generally the larger the class the greater the
expense of litigation.
There are additional reasons for allowing class solicitation-the
constitutional provisions of free speech and due process of the first167 and
fourteenth 168 amendments. 169 The Supreme Court has held that some
kinds of solicitation are protected by the first amendment. 170 Although
each of the main cases 171 dealt with by the Court involved a group
previously organized for a purpose other than litigation, the Court's
reasoning may also be applicable in a class action situation. As was
stated:
[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment. However, that right would be a hollow promise if
courts could deny associations of workers or others the means of
enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation.1
72
The Court could find no compelling state interest to support anti-
solicitation regulations. In addition, the control of communications to a
class may be an unconstitutional prior restraint under the first amend-
ment. 1
73
The UCAA clause which provides that attorneys for the class may
advance the costs of the suit 174 is directly contrary to the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility which does not allow attorneys to advance or
guarantee the costs of litigation unless the client remains ultimately liable
166. "The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize
their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able to
obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-1 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
168. Id. amend. XIV.
169. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975), noted in 88 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1975).
170. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
171. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); District 12, UMW v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia,
377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
172. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971).
173. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975), noted in 88 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1975).
174. UCAA § 17(b).
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for such expenses. 175 Such an act constitutes maintenance. Ordinarily,
the class members are not ultimately liable as the expense incurred in
bringing suit is usually deducted from any recovery. 176 This is of course
contingent upon the plaintiff class prevailing. 1
77
Courts suspecting maintenance have allowed class opponents to dis-
cover who has assumed responsibility for litigation costs.17 8 The primary
argument against allowing the attorney to advance costs of litigation is
that most class actions are brought to collect a large fee or coerce a
settlement for the Attorney's benefit. 17 9 There would seem to be little
concern for recovery if the class members do not desire to advance the
costs of litigation.
On the other hand,, the courts have supervisory powers over the action
and have disapproved dismissals even when both parties have stipulated
to a settlement. 8 An attorney is unlikely to bring a frivolous suit, as his
recovery of costs incurred depends upon a successful suit and the court
has supervisory power over the amount of the fee that will be collect-
ed.' The named plaintiffs may be unable to advance the costs of
litigation. Disgorging ill-gotten gains and preventing future undesirable
conduct are legitimate concerns favoring maintenance.
F. Relief
The problem of how to fashion relief for large classes where a mone-
tary judgment has been awarded has been the subject of much discussion
and has resulted in varying suggestions.' 82 The desirability of the alterna-
tives depends to a large extent upon one's viewpoint of the purpose of the
action.
175. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B) (1975).
176. See, e.g., Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 597 (D. Colo. 1974).
177. Attorney's fees are also awarded out of any recovery as a judicially created out-
growth of the equity powers of the federal courts. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
178. See, e.g., Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 386
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
179. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard,
C.J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D.
Pa. 1967).
181. See, e.g. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,472 (2d Cir. 1974) (setting
aside a fee at the rate of $635 per attorney-hour and remanding to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing as to the propriety of the amount of the fee).
182. See Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculations in Consumer
Class Actions, 70 MICH. L. REV. 338, 360-73 (1971).
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
One viewpoint finds the goal of precise compensation to individual
class members for their personal injuries of primary importance. Under
an extreme approach, each class member is required to come forth
individually and prove in a full evidentiary hearing his right to a portion
of the recovery. 83 It has been argued that this procedure is a requirement
of due process,' 84 though some authors feel it is not.185 A less drastic
approach, but nonetheless one with precise compensation as the funda-
mental premise, is requiring the use of individual proof of claim forms
from each absent class member in order to establish a personal right of
recovery. 86 The problem with this approach is that many persons will not
file proof of claim forms, particularly where individual recovery is small,
and the defendant will thereby escape a large portion of his liability. For
instance, in Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission187 a
railroad company had collected $700,000 in excess trolley fares, yet
individual claims amounted to only $12,000 with the average claim being
$2.00.188
If deterrence of undesirable conduct and prevention of unjust enrich-
ment to the defendant constitute the rationale for the class action, then
different forms of relief are available. Rather than calculating damages
individually, the aggregate amount of damages suffered by the class is
calculated. 89 The adoption of this procedure raises some difficult ques-
tions. Must each class member be given the opportunity to establish his
claim to a portion of the recovery? As to those funds which are not
claimed by the absent class members, several alternatives exist: the funds
could be distributed generally to the individual class members, returned
to the defendant, escheat to the state, or could be used under court
supervision for some purpose generally beneficial to the class as a whole
though not necessarily to its individuals. The focus here is not upon
whether the defendant has the right to require each individual class
member to prove his damages, but whether there is a right in each class
member to assert a claim to a portion of the damage recovery. Examples
183. See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
184. See City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 61 (D.N.J. 1971).
185. See, e.g., Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 ORE. L. REv. 225
(1974).
186. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Utah 1966).
187. 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d 875 (1946).
188. Id. at 366, 171 P.2d at 877.
189. E.g., Bebchick v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963). See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695,433 P.2d 732, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
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of cases in which there was no opportunity at all for individual class
members to claim a portion of the recovery are rare.19°
The UCAA implies that individual notice to each class member of a
recovery right is not required. Only those parties whose identities can be
determined without expending a disproportionate share of the recovery
need be notified, 191 and the court shall supervise the distribution of funds
to the members of the class as their interests warrant. 192 If, for instance,
the cost of notice is greater than the estimated amount of individual
recovery, it seems that the court may fashion whatever relief it deems
appropriate. However, section 15(c)(5) of the UCAA implies that dam-
ages should be given to each class member who claims a portion of the
money. 
193
Usually the problem arises when all the individual claims have been
satisfied and there are funds, determined to be owed to the class in the
aggregate, which are undistributed. These funds may be returned to the
defendant or escheat to the state, as a provision of the UCAA allows. 194
The other alternative is to use the funds to benefit the class as a whole.-
The term "fluid recovery" is generally used to describe the methods
by which the unclaimed funds may be used to benefit the class as a
whole. It has been both approved 95 and rejected' 96 by the courts. The
primary criticism of a "fluid" approach is that the recovery may benefit
persons who were not injured by the defendant's conduct.197
Fluid recovery can take three forms. The first form is a direct distribu-
tion for the benefit of the class. Although such a provision was contained
in earlier drafts of the proposed UCAA, 198 it was eliminated from the
final version.
190. For two examples, both cases being terminated as a result of a court approved
settlement, see Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967) and Kurman v. Purex Corp., an unreported Los Angeles Superior Court case, No.
995 518 (1971), cited in Grossman, Class Actions: Manageability and the Fluid Recovery
Doctrine, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 415, 420 (1972).
191. UCAA § 15(c)(I)-(2).
192. Id. § 15(c)(4).
193. Id. § 15(c)(5).
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 262-63 (5th Cir.
1974); Bebchick v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203-04 (D.C. Cir.) (supplemental
opinion), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
196. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971). In
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated & remanded
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that fluid recovery violates due process but did not explain its reasoning.
197. See Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U.
CH. L. REV. 448, 461-62 (1972).
198. See The Special Committee on Uniform Class Actions Act National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Fourth Tentative Draft of the Proposed Uniform
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The second form of fluid recovery is to return the funds to the
defendant but impose conditions upon the use of the funds which require
him to remedy or alleviate any harm done. 199 The comment to section 15
of the UCAA gives as an example an "affirmative" use of the funds by
requiring a defendant who is sued because of the discharge of pollutants
to spend any unclaimed funds to install pollution-control devices .200 The
UCAA would thus apparently authorize a type of fluid recovery. There is
uncertainty as to whether or not -the UCAA would allow a "negative"
use of the funds such as a reduction in the market price of an item or
service, a frequently employed device.201 Is price reduction considered a
direct distribution for the benefit of the class or is it considered a return of
the funds to the defendant so that the harm may be alleviated? The better
view and the one consistent with a policy of deterrence is to allow a
reduction in prices as a type of fluid recovery. While promoting the
deterrence function, this concept comes closest to compensating class
members.
The third method of fluid recovery is payment of any unclaimed funds
to the state, which is authorized by the UCAA. 20 2 This is the extreme
view of deterrence and disgorgement and is an alternative to conditioned
payment to the defendant. This method has rarely been followed al-
though there is precedent for this type of recovery.20 3
How is the trial court to decide which alternative to use in distributing
the unclaimed damages? The class action is a procedural device, not a
substantive cause of action and courts must be flexible in its use. In
recognition that the nature and seriousness of the substantive violation
must be considered in fashioning relief, the drafters of the UCAA in
section 15(c)(6) established criteria which the trial court should follow.2°4
IV. CONCLUSION
The class action device was originally designed to promote judicial
efficiency by deciding common issues of law and fact in one representa-
Class Actions Act, reprinted in The Proposed Uniform Class Action Act-lI, 4 CLASS ACT.
REP. 492, 496 (1975).
199. See UCAA § 15(c)(7).
200. Id. § 15, Comment.
201. See, e.g., Alaska Steamship Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 344 F.2d 810 (9th
Cir. 1965); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Scattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939).
202. UCAA § 15(c)(5).
203. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
204. UCAA § 15(c)(6).
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tive action where there existed the possibility of numerous individual
claimants coming before the court. The nature and purpose of the modern
day representative suit must be carefully considered by any legislature
considering class action legislation. The structure of class action statutes
must reflect what is determined to be the function of the class action.
There are two basic purposes of the modem class action: first, to
provide recovery for individual class members, and second, to deter
undesirable social conduct and to force the defendant to disgorge any
unjustly acquired gains. The UCAA's provisions indicate the drafters'
intent to compromise between these two functions. By attempting to
compromise, the UCAA has drawn criticism from both liberal and
conservative viewpoints.
The UCAA favors the use of state class actions and eliminates many of
the obstacles to representative suits as indicated by the notice and solici-
tation provisions. The drafters of the UCAA have recognized, in the
escheat provision for instance, that disgorgement is as important as
recovery.
The UCAA also provides needed flexibility by allowing, for example,
interlocutory appeal of the class maintainability determination. The pro-
vision allowing discovery from absent class members indicates a concern
for the rights of the party opposing the class. To prevent possible abuse
from either side, the UCAA indicates that the trial court is to take an
active role in order to protect the interests of absent class members and
guarantee their constitutional due process rights.
The UCAA, unlike FRCP 23 and existing state provisions, is to be
commended for providing considerable guidance in its provisions and
attempting to make state courts more accessible to representative suits.
With the costs of litigation continuing to increase, the class action may be
the only effective method of obtaining recovery for large numbers of
claimants with small individual claims. In areas such as antitrust, without
the class action most members of the public would have little idea that
they were subjected to illegal practices.
There are some criticisms which can be directed at the UCAA. The
discovery and jurisdiction sections tend to oppose the desired goal of
uniformity. In attempting to provide specificity there are, ironically,
many vague issues and some unanswered questions. The failure to
provide lengthy comments indicating the drafters' intent as to the mean-
ing and purpose of the various sections was a serious omission.
States should adopt the theme of the UCAA, which is to encourage
class actions. Its provisions alleviate many of the present difficulties in
1978]
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bringing representative suits. When individual recovery is not practical,
deterrence and disgorgement should not be abandoned. Legislatures
should avoid compromise and should be certain to make their intent clear
and provide sufficient guidance and clarity to the courts.
Dana Sherman
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Prefatory Note
A class action is an equitable concept which originated as an exception to the general
rule in equity that all persons (however numerous) materially interested in the subject
matter of a suit were to be made parties to it. The class suit was an invention of equity to
allow a suit to proceed when the parties interested in the subject were so numerous that it
would have been impracticable to join them without long delays and inconveniences
which would obstruct the purposes of justice. Under these conditions representatives of a
class conduct litigation on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated and the
judgment binds all members.
The first state statute on class suits was the 1849 Amendment to the Field Code of New
York which attempted to codify the pre-existing equity law on representative suits. Two
types of representative suits which could be maintained under the rules of equity were
specially adopted as allowable under the Field Code. The first type of suit involved
actions where the question was one of a common or general interest and one or more class
members sued for the benefit of the entire class. The second type involved cases in which
the parties were very numerous and it was impracticable to bring them all before the court.
A common interest or right was present among the members and the representatives
sought to establish or enforce this right in order to benefit all the members of the class in
common and injure none. Other states have adopted statutes modeled on these concepts.
In 1938 the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Rule
23 which governed class actions for federal courts. Many states have adopted a version of
this rule. The 1938 Rule 23 created three separate categories of class actions based on the
substantive character of the right asserted by the class and the res judicata effect of the
class action judgments on nonappearing members. The first category, the "true" class
suit, requires a common or joint cause of action that exists for all parties and the issues
determined in the suit are preclusive to all class members. The second type is the
"hybrid" suit requiring each member to have an interest in a specific fund or property
which is in controversy and the judgment binds the rights of the class with respect to the
property involved. The third type, "spurious," requires that a common question of law or
fact affect the several rights involved and a common relief must be sought. The decree in
such actions had no binding effect on nonappearing members. Class actions of the latter
sort were merely invitations to join.
In 1966 Federal Rule 23 was amended. The new Rule 23 is divided into five subsections
dealing with different procedural requirements for bringing a class suit. After satisfying
the four prerequisites of subsection (a), a class suit must fit in one of the three categories
of subsection (b) which describe appropriate occasions for maintaining a class action:
23(b)(1) where difficulties would be likely to arise if separate actions were brought by class
members; 23(b)(2) where the party opposing the class has improperly acted on grounds
generally applicable to the class so as to create a need for injunctive relief; or 23(b)(3)
where common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class
members and a class action is superior to other adjudicatory methods. A judgment under
the amended rule binds all those whom the court finds to be members of the class. Several
states have a version of this rule for their class action statute.
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Presently three types of class action statutes predominate in the United States; (1) the
Field Code provision, (2) state statutes modeled on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as it existed prior to July, 1966, and (3) statutes modeled on the new Federal
Rule 23. Some states still do not have a class action statute. State rules based on the Field
Code and the earlier Federal Rule pose distinct problems and disadvantages in maintaining
class suits. Recent Supreme Court decisions have severely limited the availability of the
present Rule 23 as a group remedy. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)
the Court held that each of the class members in a diversity action under Rule 23 must
satisfy the jurisdictional amount of more than $10,000 and any members who do not must
be dismissed from the case. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 136 [sic] (1974) the
Supreme Court interpreted Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) io require personal notice of the action
to all identifiable class members with service costs to be borne by the plaintiffs.
More classes with claims will be seeking redress in state courts because the federal
courts have severely restricted th [sic] availability of class actions in their forum. Pres-
ently state statutes vary in their treatment of class actions. A strong need exists for states
to adopt a uniform class action act. Many activities have impact on large numbers of
persons often from several states. Adoption of a uniform act will assist states in handling
multistate class actions, thereby reducing multiplicity of litigation and the chance of
inconsistent judgments. The Act provides supervision of the adequacy of representation
by the representative parties to insure that the interests of the class will be protected.
Subsections to cover special problems of the class action are provided: notice techniques,
discovery of the members of the class, effect of the judgment on the members of the class,
methods of fashioning relief, and liability for costs and expenses.
This Act applies whenever an action involving a class is commenced. When a final order
refusing to certify a class action is entered, the application of this Act will terminate. The
scope of this Act is similar to that of F.R.C.P. 23 and does not cover derivative actions by
shareholders or suits by unincorporated associations.
Within the limits of practicality, due process requires that all individuals be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). A class
action is a procedure by which people with small claims or limited means can exercise
their rights and thereby make our system of justice more responsive to their needs.
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Section 1. [Commencement of a Class Action]
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all in a class action if:
(1) the class is so numerous or so constituted that joinder of all members, whether or
not otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; and
(2) there is a question of law or fact common to the class.
Comment
This section sets forth the requirements be brought. Section 2 authorizes the certifi-
that must be satisfied if a class action is to cation of a class action.
Section 2. [Certification of Class Action]
(a) Unless deferred by the court, as soon as practicable after the commencement of a
class action the court shall hold a hearing and determine whether or not the action is to be
maintained as a class action and by order certify or refuse to certify it as a class action.
(b) The court may certify an action as a class action, if it finds that (1) the require-
ments of Section 1 have been satisfied, (2) a class action should be permitted for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy, and (3) the representative parties fairly and
adequately will protect the interests of the class.
(c) If appropriate, the court may (I) certify an action as a class action with respect to a
particular claim or issue, (2) certify an action as a class action to obtain one or more forms
of relief, equitable, declaratory, or monetary, or (3) divide a class into subclasses and treat
each subclass as a class.
Comment
The standard established under 2(b)(2) is lished under 2(b)(3) is elaborated in Section
elaborated in Section 3(a) and that estab- 3(b).
Section 3. [Criteria Considered]
(a) In determining whether the class action should be permitted for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy, as appropriately limited under Section 2(c), the
court shall consider, and give appropriate weight to, the following and other relevant
factors:
(1) whether a joint or common interest exists among members of the class;
(2) whether the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for a party opposing the class;
(3) whether adjudications with respect to individual members of the class as a
practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to
the adjudication or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their inter-
ests;
(4) whether a party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole;
(5) whether common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members;
(6) whether other means of adjudicating the claims and defenses are impracticable
or inefficient;
(7) whether a class action offers the most appropriate means of adjudicating the
claims and defenses;
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(8) whether members not representative parties have a substantial interest in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(9) whether the class action involves a claim that is or has been the subject of a
class action, a government action, or other proceeding;
(10) whether it is desirable to bring the class action in another forum;
(11) whether management of the class action poses unusual difficulties;
(12) whether any conflict of laws issues involved pose unusual difficulties; and
(13) whether the claims of individual class members are insufficient in the
amounts or interests involved, in view of the complexities of the issues and the
expenses of the litigation, to afford significant relief to the members of the class.
(b) In determining under Section 2(b) that the representative parties fairly and ade-
quately will protect the interests of the class, the court must find that:
(I) the attorney for the representative parties will adequately represent the inter-
ests of the class;
(2) the representative parties do not have a conflict of interest in the maintenance
of the class action; and
(3) the representative parties have or can acquire adequate financial resources,
considering Section 17, to assure that the interests of the class will not be harmed.
Comment
The factors listed in Section 3(a)(l) to
(13), possibly along with other factors, are
to be considered by the court in determin-
ing whether to certify the action as a class
action. The factors may be given different
weight by the court.
After an action has been brought as a
class action, if the court determines that
there is pending in another court an action
which encompasses the action pending
both as to general class and claim, it may
refuse under Subsection 3(a)(9) and (10) to
certify the action against or on behalf of the
class if it concludes that this forum is not
the most appropriate one. The court in
making this decision should consider the
sequence of the suits, the residence of the
members of the class, where the transac-
tion or occurrence involved took place,
where the relevant evidence is available,
and other pertinent facts.
Section 4. [Order on Certification]
(a) The order of certification shall describe the class and state: (1) the relief sought, (2)
whether the action is maintained with respect to particular claims or issues, and (3)
whether subclasses have been created.
(b) The order certifying or refusing to certify a class action shall state the reasons for
the court's ruling and its findings on the facts listed in Section 3(a).
(c) An order certifying or refusing to certify an action as a class action is appealable.
(d) Refusal of certification does not terminate the action, but does preclude it from
being maintained as a class action.
Comment
If class certification is denied, subsec-
tion (d) presupposes the existence of rules
of civil procedure which will allow the ac-
tion to continue with the representative
parties as properly joined parties.
Denial of certification and the allowance
of a personal action under subsection (d)
does not affect any possible intervention or
joinder of class members who are not rep-
resentative parties under the applicable
state laws.
Section 5. [Amendment of Certification Order]
(a) The court may amend the certification order at any time before entry of judgment
on the merits. The amendment may (1) establish subclasses, (2) eliminate from the class
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any class member who was included in the class as certified, (3) provide for an adjudica-
tion limited to certain claims or issues, (4) change the relief sought, or (5) make any other
appropriate change in the order.
(b) If notice of certification has been given pursuant to Section 7, the court may order
notice of the amendment of the certification order to be given in terms and to any
members of the class the court directs.
(c) The reasons for the court's ruling shall be set forth in the amendment of the
certification order.
(d) An order amending the certification order is appealable. An order denying the
motion of a member of a defendant class, not a representative party, to amend the
certification order is appealable if the court certifies it for immediate appeal.
Comment
An order amending an order of certifica-
tion is an appealable order as is an order
certifying or refusing to certify an action as
a class action.
A member of a defendant class can at-
tempt to get out of a class action by seeking
an amendment of the order of certification.
If a member of a defendant class seeks an
amendment which would delete him or her
from the class and the court refused to
make such an order, an appeal can be taken
if the court certifies it for appeal.
Under Section 5(b) the court may order
notice given of an amendment if it deems it
desirable in light of the nature of the
amendment and the notice previously
given.
Section 6. [Jurisdiction over Multi-State Classes]
[(a)] A court of this State may exercise jurisdiction over any person who is a member
of the class suing or being sued if:
[(I)] a basis for jurisdiction exists or would exist in a suit against the person under
the law of this State[;J[or]
[(2) the state of residence of the class member, by class action law similar to
subsection (b), has made its residents subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State.]
[(b) A resident of this State who is a member of a class suing or being sued in another
state is subject to the jurisdiction of that state if by similar class action law it extends
reciprocal jurisdiction to this State.]
Comment
The reach of the court under this Act is
restricted by both constitutional and statu-
tory or rule limitations. Persons beyond the
court's reach may be able to participate in a
plaintiff class action by intervention under
provisions similar to Federal Rule 24 which
exist in most states.
The court in deciding whether to certify
the action as a class action is to consider
the conflict of laws problems which may be
involved. (See Section 3(12).) Those prob-
lems may exist because of the possibility of
bringing the action in a jurisdiction other
than that in which the operative facts oc-
curred and because of the reach of the
court under this section beyond the state in
which the court is sitting.
The bracketed subsections of Section 6
incorporate reciprocal provisions which
would allow a state to exercise jurisdiction
in a sister state if that state has a reciprocal
grant of power. There is some precedent
for this sort of provision. (See, for exam-
ple, the Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law [Act) [Rule], the Uniform Foreign
Depositions Act, and the Uniform Manda-
tory Disposition of Detainers Act.)
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Section 7. [Notice of Action]
(a) Following certification, the court by order, after hearing, shall direct the giving of
notice to the class.
(b) The notice, based on the certification order and any amendment of the order, shall
include:
(1) a general description of the action, including the relief sought, and the names
and addresses of the representative parties;
(2) a statement of the right of a member of the class under Section 8 to be
excluded from the action by filing an election to be excluded, in the manner specified,
by a certain date;
(3) a description of possible financial consequences on the class;
(4) a general description of any counterclaim being asserted by or against the
class, including the relief sought;
(5) a statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all members
of the class who are not excluded from the action;
(6) a statement that any member of the class may enter an appearance either
personally or through counsel;
(7) an address to which inquiries may be directed; and
(8) other information the court deems appropriate.
(c) The order shall prescribe the manner of notification to be used and specify the
members of the class to be notified. In determining the manner and form of the notice to
be given, the court shall consider the interests of the class, the relief requested, the cost of
notifying the members of the class, and the possible prejudice to members who do not
receive notice.
(d) Each member of the class, not a representative party, whose potential monetary
recovery or liability is estimated to exceed $100 shall be given personal or mailed notice if
his identity and whereabouts can be ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
(e) For members of the class not given personal or mailed notice under subsection (d),
the court shall provide, as a minimum, a means of notice reasonably calculated to apprise
the members of the class of the pendency of the action. Techniques calculated to assure
effective communication of information concerning commencement of the action shall be
used. The techniques may include personal or mailed notice, notification by means of
newspaper, television, radio, posting in public or other places, and distribution through
trade, union, public interest, or other appropriate groups.
(f) The plaintiff shall advance the expense of notice under this section if there is no
counterclaim asserted. If a counterclaim is asserted the expense of notice shall be
allocated as the court orders in the interest of justice.
(g) The court may order that steps be taken to minimize the expense of notice.
Comment
The hearing required by subsection (a) persons to be notified and the form of
can be combined with the hearing required notice and, to some extent, the content.
by Section 2(a). Subsection (c) indicates that the court must
Personal mailed notice to all members of consider a number of factors in deciding
the class is not required by this Act. For what type of notice to give.
consideration of the notice required by the Subsection (g) allows the court to order a
U. S. Constitution, see Gant v. City of defendant who has a mailing list of class
Lincoln, 225 N.W.2d 549 (Neb. 1975), and members to co-operate with the representa-
Cartt v. Superior Court in and for County tive parties in notifying the class members.
of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Use of a computer or enclosing notice in a
Cal. Rptr. 376 (Ct. App. 1975). regular mailing would be possibilities.
The notice to be given may vary as to the
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Section 8. [Exclusion]
(a) A member of a plaintiff class may elect to be excluded from the action unless (I) he
is a representative party, (2) the certification order contains an affirmative finding under
paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 3(a), or (3) a counterclaim under Section 11 is pending
against the member or his class or subclass.
(b) Any member of a plaintiff class entitled to be excluded under subsection (a) who
files an election to be excluded, in the manner and in the time specified in the notice, is
excluded from and not bound by the judgment in the class action.
(c) The elections shall be [docketed] [made a part of the record] in the action.
(d) A member of a defendant class may not elect to be excluded.
Comment
Under some circumstances members of a
plaintiff class cannot elect to be excluded
because they are indispensable parties.
This would be determined by the court in
ruling on certification considering the
criteria of Section 3(a). Such situations
might arise in actions comparable to those
under Federal Rule 23(b)(1); see 3B,
Moore's Federal Practice, 23.35. In most
situations members of a plaintiff class will
be permitted to elect to be excluded.
A class member aggrieved by an affirma-
tive finding under Section 3(a)(1), (2), or (3)
might seek relief through one of the extra-
ordinary writs or through an interlocutory
appeal if authorized by the state practice.
Section 9. [Conduct of Action]
(a) The court on motion of a party or its own motion may make or amend any
appropriate order dealing with the conduct of the action including, but not limited to, the
following: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent
undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requir-
ing, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be given as the court directs, of (i) any step in the action, (ii) the
proposed extent of the judgment, or (iii) the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to enter an appearance and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise participate in the action; (3) imposing conditions on the
representative parties or on intervenors; (4) inviting the attorney general to participate
with respect to the question of adequacy of class representation; (5) making any other
order to assure that the class action proceeds only with adequate class representation; and
(6) making any order to assure that the class action proceeds only with competent
representation by the attorney for the class.
(b) A class member not a representative party may appear and be represented by
separate counsel.
Comment
The rules governing civil procedure in
the courts of the state normally will govern
procedures in class actions. Section 9
covers certain matters which deserve spec-
ial consideration. Section 9(a)(4) does not
limit the power of the attorney general to
participate in litigation under other applica-
ble provisions.
Section 10. [Discovery by or against Class Members]
(a) Discovery under [applicable discovery rules] may be used only on order of the
court against a member of the class who is not a representative party or who has not
appeared. In deciding whether discovery should be allowed the court shall consider,
among other relevant factors, the timing of the request, the subject matter to be covered,
whether representatives of the class are seeking discovery on the subject to be covered,
and whether the discovery will result in annoyance, oppression, or undue burden or
expense for the member of the class.
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(b) Discovery by or against representative parties or those appearing is governed by
the rules dealing with discovery by or against a party to a civil action.
Comment
Under Section 10 members of the class Discovery against representative parties
not representative parties and not appear- may include the representative parties' fee
ing are not treated as parties to the litiga- arrangement with counsel. Disclosure of
tion for discovery purposes. Discovery can this arrangement is required under Section
be obtained of these members only on or- 17.
der of court.
Section 11. [Counterclaims]
(a) A defendant in an action brought by a class may plead as a counterclaim any claim
the court certifies as a class action against the plaintiff class. On leave of court, the
defendant may plead as a counterclaim a claim against a member of the class or a claim the
court certifies as a class action against a subclass.
(b) Any counterclaim in an action brought by a plaintiff class must be asserted before
notice is given under Section 7.
(c) If a judgment for money is recovered against a party on behalf of a class, the court
rendering judgment may stay distribution of any award or execution of any portion of a
judgment allocated to a member of the class against whom the losing party has pending an
action in or out of state for a judgment for money, and continue the stay so long as the
losing party in the class action pursues the pending action with reasonable diligence.
(d) A defendant class may plead as a counterclaim any claim on behalf of the class that
the court certifies as a class action against the plaintiff. The court may certify as a class
action a counterclaim against the plaintiff on behalf of a subclass or permit a counterclaim
by a member of the class. The court shall order that notice of the counterclaim by the
class, subclass, or member of the class be given to the members of the class as the court
directs, in the interest of justice.
(e) A member of a class or subclass asserting a counterclaim shall be treated as a
member of a plaintiff class for the purpose of exclusion under Section 8.
(f) The court's refusal to allow, or the defendant's failure to plead, a claim as a
counterclaim in a class action does not bar the defendant from asserting the claim in a
subsequent action.
Comment
Nothing in this Act precludes a party op- concerning compulsory counterclaims in-
posing the class from bringing an action applicable in a class action under this Act.
against a member of the class concurrently The expense of notification of actions
with the class action or in the future. Sub- involving counterclaims is to be determined
section (f) makes the ordinary rules as provided in Section 7(f).
Section 12. [Dismissal or Compromise]
(a) Unless certification has been refused under Section 2, a class action without the
approval of the court after hearing, may not be (1) dismissed voluntarily, (2) dismissed
involuntarily without an adjudication on the merits, or (3) compromised.
(b) If the court has certified the action under Section 2, notice of hearing on the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in a manner
the court directs. If the court has not ruled on certification, notice of hearing on the
proposed dismissal or compromise may be ordered by the court which shall specify the
persons to be notified and the manner in which notice is to be given.
(c) Notice given under subsection (b) shall include a full disclosure of the reasons for
the dismissal or compromise including, but not limited to, (1) any payments made or to be
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made in connection with the dismissal or compromise, (2) the anticipated effect of the
dismissal or compromise on the class members, (3) any agreement made in connection
with the dismissal or compromise, (4) a description and evaluation of alternatives con-
sidered by the representative parties and (5) an explanation of any other circumstances
giving rise to the proposal. The notice also shall include a description of the procedure
available for modification of the dismissal or compromise.
(d) On the hearing of the dismissal or compromise, the court may:
(I) as to the representative parties or a class certified under Section 2, permit
dismissal with or without prejudice or approve the compromise;
(2) as to a class not certified, permit dismissal without prejudice;
(3) deny the dismissal;
(4) disapprove the compromise; or
(5) take other appropriate action for the protection of the class and in the interest
of justice.
(e) The cost of notice given under subsection (b) shall be paid by the party seeking
dismissal, or as agreed in case of a compromise, unless the court after hearing orders
otherwise.
Comment
This section covers class actions brought refused under Section 2, as well as class
under Section 1 until certification has been actions certified under Section 2.
Section 13. [Effect of Judgment on Class]
In a class action certified under Section 2 in which notice has been given under Section 7
or 12, a judgment as to the claim or particular claim or issue certified is binding, according
to its terms, on any member of the class who has not filed an election of exclusion under
Section 8. The judgment shall name or describe the members of the class who are bound
by its terms.
Comment
Section 13 deals with the application of a member of the class who has requested
class action judgment to the members of exclusion. This is a matter which is govern-
the class. This Act does not deal with the ed by the normal rules of res judicata/pre-
preclusive effect of a class action upon a clusion.
Section 14. [Costs]
(a) Only the representative parties and those members of the class who have appeared
individually are liable for costs assessed against a plaintiff class.
(b) The court shall apportion the liability for costs assessed against a defendant class.
(c) Expenses of notice advanced under Section 7 are taxable as costs in favor of the
prevailing party.
Comment
Section 14 specifies the liability of class The nature of other costs and assess-
members when costs are assessed against ments against parties in a class action is left
the class and provides for assessment of to the law generally applicable in the state.
the expense of notification under Section 7.
Section 15. [Relief Afforded]
(a) The court may award any form of relief consistent with the certification order to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled including equitable, declaratory,
monetary, or other relief to individual members of the class or the class in a lump sum or
installments.
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(b) Damages fixed by a minimum measure of recovery provided by any statute may
not be recovered in a class action.
(c) If a class is awarded a judgment for money, the distribution shall be determined as
follows:
(1) The parties shall list as expeditiously as possible all members of the class
whose identity can be determined without expending a disproportionate share of the
recovery.
(2) The reasonable expense of identification and distribution shall be paid, with
the court's approval, from the funds to be distributed.
(3) The court may order steps taken to minimize the expense of identification.
(4) The court shall supervise, and may grant or stay the whole or any portion of,
the execution of the judgment and the collection and distribution of funds to the
members of the class as their interests warrant.
(5) The court shall determine what amount of the funds available for the payment
of the judgment cannot be distributed to members of the class individually because
they could not be identified or located or because they did not claim or prove the right
to money apportioned to them. The-court after hearing shall distribute that amount, in
whole or in part, to one or more states as unclaimed property or to the defendant.
(6) In determining the amount, if any, to be distributed to a state or to the
defendant, the court shall consider the following criteria: (i) any unjust enrichment of
the defendant; (ii) the willfulness or lack of willfulness on the part of the defendant;
(iii) the impact on the defendant of the relief granted; (iv) the pendency of other
claims against the defendant; (v) any criminal sanction imposed on the defendant; and
(vi) the loss suffered by the plaintiff class.
(7) The court, in order to remedy or alleviate any harm done, may impose
conditions on the defendant respecting the use of the money distributed to him.
(8) Any amount to be distributed to a state shall be distributed as unclaimed
property to any state in which are located the last known addresses of the members of
the class to whom distribution could not be made. If the last known addresses cannot
be ascertained with reasonable diligence, the court may determine by other means
what portion of the unidentified or unlocated members of the class were residents of a
state. A state shall receive that portion of the distribution that its residents would have
received had they been identified and located. Before entering an order distributing
any part of the amount to a state, the court shall given [sic] written notice of its
intention to make distribution to the attorney general of the state of the residence of
any person given notice under Section 7 or 12 and shall afford the attorney general an
opportunity to move for an order requiring payment to the state.
Comment
Subsection (c)(3) is similar to subsection
7(g) in its purpose and scope and should be
construed similarly.
Subsection 15(c)(5) provides for the pos-
sibility of escheat of funds available for the
payment of the judgment if the court, ap-
plying the relevant criteria, so orders. The
escheat provision is similar to that found in
the Model Escheat of Postal Savings Sys-
tem Accounts Act.
If the court decides that undistributed
funds available for the payment of the
judgment should be distributed to the de-
fendant, the court under subsection
15(c)(7), "in order to remedy or alleviate
any harm done, may impose conditions on
the defendant respecting the use of the
money distributed to him." For example, if
the plaintiff class sued for damage done
because of the discharge of pollutants by
the defendant and the class won a money
judgment, the court might distribute to the
defendant funds undistributed to the plain-
tiff class on condition that the defendant
use the funds to install pollution-control
devices.
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Section 16. [Attorney's Fees]
(a) Attorney's fees for representing a class are subject to control of the court.
(b) If under an applicable provision of law a defendant or defendant class is entitled to
attorney's fees from a plaintiff class, only representative parties and those members of the
class who have appeared individually are liable for those fees. If a plaintiff is entitled to
attorney's fees from a defendant class, the court may apportion the fees among the
members of the class.
(c) If a prevailing class recovers a judgment for money or other award that can be
divided for the purpose, the court may order reasonable attorney's fees and litigation
expenses of the class to be paid from the recovery.
(d) If the prevailing class is entitled to declaratory or equitable relief, the court may
order the adverse party to pay to the class its reasonable attorney's fees and litigation
expenses if permitted by law in similar cases not involving a class or the court finds that
the judgment has vindicated an important public interest. However, if any monetary
award is also recovered, the court may allow reasonable attorney's fees and litigation
expenses only to the extent that a reasonable proportion of that award is insufficient to
defray the fees and expenses.
(e) In determining the amount of attorney's fees for a prevailing class the court shall
consider the following factors:
(I) the time and effort expended by the attorney in the litigation, including the
nature, extent, and quality of the services rendered;
(2) results achieved and benefits conferred upon the class;
(3) the magnitude, complexity, and uniqueness of the litigation;
(4) the contingent nature of success;
(5) in cases awarding attorney's fees and litigation expenses under subsection (d)
because of the vindication of an important public interest, the economic impact on the
party against whom the award is made; and
(6) appropriate criteria in the [state's Code of Professional Responsibility].
Comment
Most of the factors listed in subsection Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
(e) are taken from Lindy Bros. v. American F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973).
Section 17. [Arrangements for Attorney's Fees and Expenses]
(a) Before a hearing under Section 2(a) or at any other time the court directs, the
representative parties and the attorney for the representative parties shall file with the
court, jointly or separately: (I) a statement showing any amount paid or promised them by
any person for the services rendered or to be rendered in connection with the action or for
the costs and expenses of the litigation and source of all of the amounts; (2) a copy of any
written agreement, or a summary of any oral agreement, between the representative
parties and their attorney concerning financial arrangments or fees and (3) a copy of any
written agreement, or a summary of any oral agreement, by the representative parties or
the attorney to share these amounts with any person other than a member, regular
associate, or an attorney regularly of counsel with his law firm. This statement shall be
supplemented promptly if additional arrangements are made.
(b) Upon a determination that the costs and litigation expenses of the action cannot
reasonably and fairly be defrayed by the representative parties or by other available
sources, the court by order may authorize and control the solicitation and expenditure of
voluntary contributions for this purpose from members of the class, advances by the
attorneys or others, or both, subject to reimbursement from any recovery obtained for the
class. The court may order any available funds so contributed or advanced to be applied to
the payment of any costs taxed in favor of a party opposing the class.
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Comment
Section 17 requires this information to be
disclosed in order to assist the court in
making determinations concerning (I) ade-
quacy of representation by the representa-
tive parties and by the attorney for the
class, (2) any possible collusion between
the representative parties and the attorney
for the class, and (3) any possible conflict
of interests among the representative par-
ties and the class members.
This section is grounded on the idea that
representative parties are fiduciaries for
the class and that class actions are unique
and require treatment different from ordi-
nary actions.
If the information available under this
section shows that an action has been im-
providently brought, action can then be
taken under Section 9(a)(5) or (6).
Section 18. [Statute of Limitations]
The statute of limitations is tolled for all class members upon the commencement of an
action asserting a class action. The statute of limitations resumes running against a
member of a class:
(I) upon his filing an election of exclusion;
(2) upon entry of an order of certification, or of an amendment thereof, eliminating
him from the class;
(3) except as to representative parties, upon entry of an order under Section 2 refusing
to certify the action as a class action; and
(4) upon dismissal of the action without an adjudication on the merits.
Comment
Section 18 adopts the principles of
American Pipe and Construction Co. v.
Utah, 415 U.S. 952, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38
L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), which held that the
commencement of a class action under
Federal Rule 23 suspends the applicable
statute of limitation to all members of the
class pending a determination of class ac-
tion status.
Section 19. [Uniformity of Application and Construction]
This [Act] [Rule] shall be construed and applied to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] [Rule] among states
enacting it.
Section 20. [Short Title]
This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as the "Uniform Class Actions [Act] [Rule]."
Section 21. [Repeal]
The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:
Section 22. [Time of Taking Effect]
This [Act] [Rule] shall take effect
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